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Breer: Indian Law - Mineral Taxation - Are State Severance Taxes Preempt

INDIAN LAW-MINERAL TAXATION-Are State Severance Taxes
Preempted when Imposed on Non-Indian Lessees Extracting Oil
and Gas from Indian Reservation Land? Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).
Cotton Petroleum (Cotton), a non-Indian company, extracted and
marketed oil and gas pursuant to five leases entered into with the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe (Tribe).1 Cotton's leases were located on the
Jicarilla Apache Reservation, a reservation encompassing 742,135 acres
of tribal trust property2 in northwestern New Mexico.' The Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 authorized execution of the mineral leases
subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior.4 Royalties, rents
and a severance and privilege tax from the mineral leases comprised
approximately 90% of all Tribal revenues. 5
Tribal severance and privilege taxes approximated 6% of the value
of reservation produced oil and gas.6 Additionally, New Mexico imposed
five oil and gas taxes approximating 8% of production value. 7 Hence,
off-reservation oil and gas was taxed at the state rate of 8%, whereas
on-reservation wells were burdened with a combined state and reservation rate of 14%.
Cotton brought suit in a New Mexico state court claiming the multiple taxation was an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.$
The district court rejected the commerce clause theory and concluded
New Mexico's severance taxes were not preempted by federal law.' To
grant preemption, the state tax must adversely impact the Tribe so
as to interfere with tribal sovereignty.1 0 However, the district court
found no detrimental impact on the Tribe.'1 Instead, evidence showed
1. Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698, 1703 (1989).

2. Id. at 1702. Tribal trust property is land owned by the federal government
but held in trust for the Indians. See generally Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
3. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1702.
4. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396f (1982). "Unal-

located lands within any Indian reservation... may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council
Id.
or other authorized spokesmen for such Indians ....
5. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1725 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1703. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe established the
Jicarillas' authority to impose a severance tax. The tribe's power to tax derives from
"[a]n inherent power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial management."
455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
7. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1703.
8. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 517, 519, 745, P.2d 1170, 1172 (1987).
Cotton's primary argument centered on a footnote in Merrion, 455 U.S. at 158-59, n.26.
The footnote mentioned that a state tax not commensurate with services provided might
be invalid under the commerce clause. Id. In rejecting this argument, the Court found
the Jicarillas received equal or greater per capita state expenditures than do non-Indians.
Also, no constitutional requirement exists that revenues must equal expenditures. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1714.
9. Jurisdictional Statement, App. at 17-18, Cotton, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).
10. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712-13.
11. Jurisdictional Statement, App. at 17, Cotton, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).
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Cotton, not the Tribe, was burdened by any additional tax. Expert
testimony demonstrated the Tribe could charge even higher taxes. The
ability to raise taxes was13seen as further evidence that the state taxes

did not affect the Tribe.

In affirming the district court, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
rejected any federal preemption of state taxes. The court of appeals cited
evidence of additional drilling and continuous production as further
verification that New Mexico's taxes did not inhibit Tribal selfsufficiency or economic development. 4
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the New Mexico Court of Appeals judgment. Specifically, the Court held that nonIndian lessees may be subjected to both state and Indian severance taxes
5
for production of oil and gas on Indian reservation land.'
Cotton Petroleum Corporationv. New Mexico distinguishes prior
analysis of state tax preemption in the sphere of Indian law. This
casenote analyzes and questions the distinctions drawn between Cotton and previous case law. The Court's failure to see New Mexico's severance tax as negatively impacting the Tribe leaves Indian preemption
analysis in a confusing and inconsistent state.
BACKGROUND

A state's ability to tax on-reservation oil and gas produced by nonIndians has vacillated significantly over the last 100 years. 6 The intergovernmental immunity doctrine contributed to this fluctuation in state
taxation. The theory behind the doctrine was that " 'any tax on income
a party received under a contract with the government was a tax on
the contract and thus a tax 'on' the government because it burdened
the government's power to enter into the contract.' "17
In the early twentieth century, state taxes on reservation produced
minerals were consistently held void under the intergovernmental
immunity doctrine.'" The intergovernmental immunity doctrine was
best exemplified by Gillespie v. Oklahoma.'9 The Gillespie Court found
from contracts with the governthat taxes on profits a party realized
20
ment burdened the government.

In 1938, Helvering v. Mountain ProducersCorp. overruled Gillespie
finding that non-discriminatory taxing had too attenuated an effect on
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. at 522, 745 P.2d at 1175. The New Mexico Supreme Court initially granted but then quashed Cotton's writ of certiorari. 106
N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1987).
15. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1713.
16. Id. at 1706.
17. Id. at 1706 (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 518 (1988)).
18. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1706.
19. 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
20. Id. at 506.
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governmental functions to support immunity."' The aftermath of Mountain Producers left states the right to tax non-Indian oil and gas lessees on reservation land provided Congress did not affirmatively
preempt the state taxes.2
The intergovernmental immunity doctrine represented a judiciallycreated influence on the states' ability to tax on-reservation activity.
Also critically important during this period was Congress' influence.
Early federal legislation reflected Congress' intent to assimilate Indians
into mainstream society. 2 Notable in this early period is the Act of
May 29, 1924 (1924 Act).24 The 1924 Act granted states authority to
tax mineral production on Indian reservation land and extended oil
and gas leases beyond a ten-year limit created by earlier legislation. 5
An early Attorney General opinion 6 interpreted the 1924 Act as not
2
applying to executive order reservations such as the Jicarilla Apaches. 1
To remedy this shortcoming Congress passed the Indian Oil Act of 1927
(1927 Act).28 Under the 1927 Act, oil and gas leasing on executive order
reservations was expressly brought within the states' authority to tax.29
Abruptly abandoning its assimilationist policy, Congress, in 1934,
enacted the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)V° The IRA's purpose was
to encourage economic development and a return to tribal selfdetermination.2 The IRA was seen as a vehicle for Indians32 to achieve
equality with whites, yet still retain their independence.
Inconsistencies surrounding mineral leasing continued after passage of the IRA and led Congress to enact the Indian Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938 (1938 Act)." Today, the 1938 Act is the legislation most
relevant to oil and gas leasing on Indian lands. The 1938 Act has three
essential purposes: 1) to achieve uniformity in Indian mineral leasing;
2) to harmonize mineral leasing matters with the IRA; and 3) to ensure
Indians the greatest return on their property.3 4 Most importantly, the
21. 303 U.S. 376, 386-87 (1938).
22. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1706.
23. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 128-32 (1982).

24. Act of May 29, 1924, 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982).
25. Id. The 1891 Act, amended by the 1924 and 1927 Acts and other legislation,
was the first legislation to allow mineral leasing of Indian lands, yet limited mineral
leasing to 10-year periods. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1982).
26. Cohen, supra note 23, at 408 n.34 (citing 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 181 (1924)).
27. The Jicarilla Apache Indian Reservation was established by the Executive
Order of February 1, 1887. 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904).
The 1924 statute applied only to lands leased under the 1891 Act, which required lands
to be "bought and paid for" by the Indians. Executive order reservations did not comply with the bought and paid for language.
28. Act of March 3, 1927, 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-398e (1982).
29. Id.
30. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982).
31. Cohen, supra note 23, at 147-49.
32. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973).
33. H.R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. (1938).
34. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 767 n.5 (1985). See also
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1981), amended,
665 F.2d 1390, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) [hereinafter Crow I], 657 F. Supp. 573
(D. Mont. 1985), rev'd, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), affd mem., 484 U.S. 997 (1988)
[hereinafter Crow Il].
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1938 Act is silent on state taxation, leaving open the question of congressional intent.
This question of intent remains crucial in determining federal
preemption of state regulation. Preemption concerning Indian affairs
is unique among supremacy clause analyses.35 The difference in
supremacy clause analysis reflects the longstanding tradition of Indian
sovereignty within the federal system.3 6 Courts generally preempt state
law when dealing with Indian affairs on the reservation.-7 However,
as in the present case, when the state attempts to regulate non-Indians
conducting on-reservation business, the analysis becomes complicated.38
Preemption of state regulation is tested by two independent, but
related hurdles.3" First, generally state regulation may be preempted
by federal law.4" Second, the state law may impermissibly infringe "on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them. '41 Either potential barrier is sufficient to overcome state regulation. 42 However, in recent times the Court has relied on federal
preemption rather than tribal sovereignty. 43 Instead of a means of
preemption, the right of tribal sovereignty is seen more as a "backwhich the applicable treaties and federal statutes must
drop" against
44
be read.
A series of recent cases reflect the role federal law and interference with tribal sovereignty have in preempting state taxes. Cases concerning federal law are where the federal government and/or a tribe
already has a comprehensive regulatory scheme in place. 45 For example, in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, Arizona sought to
impose a motor carrier and fuel tax on a non-Indian logging company
which conducted its entire operation on tribal and Bureau of Indian
Affairs roads.46 Federal regulations governing timber harvesting and
maintenance of tribal roads were held to be so pervasive as to preclude
state regulation. 47 The Court held that to avoid preemption a state must
perform services which justify a state tax.4 8 Arizona failed to fulfill this
requirement.4 9
35. See generally Cohen, supra note 23, at 270-79.
36. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980); see also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
37. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 142.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
42. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.
43. Mclanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
44. Id.
45. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Ramah Navajo
School Board Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
46. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 137-38.
47. Id. at 148. See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334
(1983).
48. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 148-49.
49. Id.
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A case very similar to Bracker is Ramah Navajo School Board
v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico." In Ramah, New Mexico closed
the only reservation high school, then sought to impose a gross receipts tax on two non-Indian firms constructing a new school. 5' The
Court found an insufficient state interest to support New Mexico's
tax.

51

Cases concerning interference with tribal sovereignty consist of
instances in which an on-reservation activity is vital to the tribe's economic development." For example, in Crow Tribe of Indians v. State
of Montana, Montana attempted to impose a severance tax on coal
extracted by non-Indian lessees from reservation land. 4 The Ninth Circuit found Montana's severance tax reduced the marketability of Crow
coal, thus limiting the tribe's revenue and interfering with tribal
sovereignty. 55 This interference coupled with a lack of narrowly tailored
state interests dictated preemption of state taxes.5 6
Both Bracker and Crow reveal that the Court considers preemption in light of a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency
and economic development.57
This inquiry [into preemption] is not dependent on mechanical
or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has
called for a particularizedinquiry into the nature of the state,
federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to
determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state
authority would violate federal law.5 8 (emphasis added)
The foregoing language reflects a balancing test, weighing the various state, federal and tribal interests. These three factors have been
identified more pointedly as the degree of federal regulation involved,
the regulatory and revenue raising interests of both the state and tribe
and finally the degree of state services provided. 9
Within this balancing test the Court has consistently resolved any
statutory ambiguities in favor of the Indians so as to coincide with the
policy of promoting tribal independence." Furthering this policy of
50. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).

51. Id. at 834-35.

52. Id. at 843-44.

53. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 901; California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202, 218-19, 222 (1987).
54. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 897.

55. Id. at 900.
56. Id. at 903. The Ninth Circuit also found Montana's coal taxes were preempted
because they interfered with the policies underlying the 1938 Act. Id. at 898.
57. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143-44; Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898.
58. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45.
59. Cohen, supra note 23, at 413.
60. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143-44 (citing Mclanahan,411 U.S. at 174-75). In fact,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that a conflict between state law and the purpose or operation of a federal statute is sufficient to sustain preemption. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898
(citing Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1109).
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independence, the Court has rejected the idea that Congress must
expressly state any preemptive intent."
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Cotton Petroleum,the Court held that New Mexico could impose
a severance tax on non-Indian lessees for oil and gas produced on reservation land. 2 More precisely, the Court determined that: 1) the 1938
Act's purpose is simply to provide Indians additional revenue," 2) states
are preempted only upon complete state abdication in on-reservation
activities,64 and 3) any negative impact caused by New Mexico's severance taxes was too attenuated to warrant preemption. 5
The Court determined the 1938 Act's purpose is to provide Indian
tribes with additional revenue, not to allow unbridled profit making.6
Legislative history of the 1938 Act provides scant explanation of congressional intent. The Secretary of the Interior originally suggested
the legislation. 7 Both Senate and House Reports rely on a letter from
the Secretary to enunciate legislative intent.6 8 Cotton relied on the letter's phrase about providing Indians with the "greatest return from
their property" as support for a congressional policy to maximize tribal
revenue. 69 Reinforcing Cotton's view is a footnote in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,stating that the 1938 Act's purpose is to "ensure
' 70
that Indians receive the greatest return from their property.
However, Justice Stevens writing for the majority, found the phrase
to be isolated and deemed it "unfathomable" to conclude Congress
intended to remove all state obstacles to profitability. 71 Moreover, the
Court distinguished Blackfeet as authorizing only preemption of state
taxation of Indian tribes, not precluding taxation of non-Indian lessees.72
The Court also rejected any bar to state taxation implied by the
1938 Act's silence on preemption, as opposed to the 1927 Act's affirmative approval.7" Supporting the Court's rejection was the existence
of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine at the time the 1927 Act
was passed. 74 The 1927 Act expressly authorized state taxation to avoid
61. Bracker,448 U.S. at 144 (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965)).
62. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1713.
63. Id. at 1709.
64. Id. at 1712-13.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1709.
67. Id. at 1708.
68. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 1872,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938)).
69. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1708.
70. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at 767 n.5.
71. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1709.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1710.
74. Id.
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75
the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. However, by 1938 the
76
Supreme Court had overruled the immunity doctrine.
Therefore, the Cotton majority interpreted Congress' silence on state
taxation in the 1938 Act as merely acknowledging the new rule laid
down in Mountain Producers,i.e., that states could tax non-Indian oil
and gas lessees on reservation land provided Congress did not affirmatively preempt the state taxes.7" The death of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine obviated any need for Congress to affirmatively
waive immunity as they had in the 1927 Act.

In addition to determining the 1938 Act's intent, the Court also
found that states are preempted only when they totally abdicate from
on-reservation activity. 7 Cotton argued that Bracker and Ramah
79
required the preemption of New Mexico's severance tax. The Court
federal
a
comprehensive
had found in both Ramah and Bracker that
non-involvement
state
complete
with
regulatory scheme was contrasted
in on-reservation activities."0
Justice Stevens, in Cotton, factually distinguished Bracker and
Ramah in several ways. First, unlike the situation in Ramah and
Bracker,New Mexico provided substantial on-reservation services which
justified state regulation." Between 1981 and 1985, New Mexico
provided $89,384 in services while receiving $2,293,953 in taxes from
Cotton. 2 The Court rejected Cotton's argument that taxes and services must be proportionate, citing the administrative burdens it would
83
cause and the notion that taxation is not based on a quid pro quo.
Additionally, contrary to Ramah and Bracker, the tax burden in
this case did not fall on the Tribe. 84 The Court arrived at this conclusion by adopting the lower court's finding that New Mexico's taxes had
no adverse impact on tribal development and also by noting an expert's
8 5
opinion that the Jicarillas could actually raise their taxes.
Finally, the majority distinguished state taxation in Cotton because
New Mexico regulated the spacing and mechanical integrity of the wells.
Therefore, the state did provide a modicum of services making federal
regulation merely extensive, not exclusive.86 The Court found that
did not meet the standard laid out
merely extensive federal8 regulation
7
in Bracker and Ramah.
75. Indian Oil Act of 1927, 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1982).
76. See Mountain Producers,303 U.S. at 386-87.
77. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1710-11.
78. Id. at 1712-13.
79. Id. at 1711.
80. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 148-49; Ramah, 458 U.S. at 843.
81. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712.
82. Id. (citing Brief for Appellants at 13-14).
83. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712 n.15.
84. Id. (citing Jurisdictional Statement, App. at 15).
85. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712.
86. Id. at 1712-13. Federal Regulations of oil and gas leasing are in 25 C.F.R. Part
211, 30 C.F.R. Parts 202 and 206, and 43 C.F.R. Part 3162. Brief for Appellants at 5.
87. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712.
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After delineating the necessary level of federal regulation to warrant preemption of state taxation, the Court considered the effect of
New Mexico's taxes on the Tribe. The Court viewed any state created
detrimental impact on the Tribe as too indirect and insubstantial to
justify preemption of state taxes. 8 Justice Stevens reasoned that
preemption based on such a marginal impact was tantamount to once
again endorsing the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. 9
The Court found no conflict between summarily affirming the
preemption of Montana's severance taxes in Crow and finding New Mexico's taxes too indirect to justify preemption.9" The majority viewed Montana's effective tax rate of 32.9% as "unusually large" and clearly distinguishable from New Mexico's 8% rate.9 1
ANALYSIS

The Court lacked adequate information concerning New Mexico's
taxation of on-reservation activities to accurately distinguish Crow.
The limitation on the 1938 Act's purpose as merely providing additional
revenue refutes prior case law. By granting preemption only upon complete state abdication in on-reservation activities, the Court contradicted
prior preemption analysis.
The finding that New Mexico's severance tax creates no negative
tribal impact is at a minimum unsupported and more likely incorrect.
The Court simply adopted the lower court's finding of no adverse impact
on the Jicarilla tribe. 2 This was in error for two reasons.
Cotton primarily argued throughout the litigation that the commerce clause required state taxes to equal the level of services provided.
Preemption was considered only a "backdrop" to the commerce clause
theory. 3 As a result, Cotton never introduced evidence showing the
taxes' possible detrimental effect.9 4 Thus any lack of impact appears
to have been based on speculation. A better approach would have been
to remand for further findings on the taxes' impact.
Also problematic is the majority's reliance on the district court's
finding that Cotton or its purchasers would pay the taxes, hence the
Jicarillas were not affected. This same argument was rejected in Crow.95
A tax rate of 14% as opposed to 8% makes on-reservation wells less
desirable. So either the reservation leases fewer wells than would be
possible without the state tax or there is an additional 6% going to the
state instead of the Jicarilla tribe. Either way the reduced desirabil88. Id. at 1713.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1713 n.17.
91. Id. at 1713.
92. Id. at 1712.
93. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 517, 519, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 (1987);
Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1704.
94. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1704.
95. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 899 (citing Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1113 n.13).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol25/iss2/8

8

Breer: Indian Law - Mineral Taxation - Are State Severance Taxes Preempt

1990

CASENOTES

443

ity of reservation wells translates into lower tribal revenues, thus
retarding the federal policy of self-sufficiency and economic development.
The Court also thought it important that an expert claimed tribal
tax rates on oil and gas leases could still be raised without adversely
affecting development. 6 Even so, there is an unknown maximum tax
rate at which oil and gas drilling becomes unprofitable. 7 New Mexico's taxes only accelerate the attainable limit on Tribal revenues generated by reservation leases.
A further weakness in the majority's view that New Mexico's taxes
do not adversely affect the Tribe is shown by the poorly drawn distinction between Cotton and Crow. Montana's 32.9% coal tax in Crow was
perceived as an obstacle impeding tribal economic self-sufficiency
through the reduced marketability of coal. Yet the Court viewed New
Mexico's 8% rate as too attenuated in its effect on tribal development
to adversely affect the Tribe. The Court failed to explain how at some
undetermined point between 8% and 32.9% a state tax becomes impermissibly burdensome."8
The Court erred not only by finding that state taxes caused no negative impact, but also in its strained interpretation of the 1938 Act's
intent. By limiting the 1938 Act's purpose "[t]o provid[ing] Indian tribes
with badly needed revenue... "' 9 the Court significantly shifted the previously perceived intent of the 1938 Act. Earlier case law found that the
1938 Act's intent was "to ensure that Indians receive the greatest return
from their property."1 ° This earlier interpretation of intent is more
accurate. The statute must be interpreted in light of the greater policy
of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.1 ' A
policy maximizing tribal resources promotes tribal self-sufficiency and
economic development more completely than simply providing badly
needed revenue.
Allowing New Mexico to tax mineral leases artificially lowers the
maximum Jicarilla tax which can be imposed. This contradicts the purpose of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and ignores the chronology of
legislation leading up to the 1938 Act. Four years before the 1938 Act,
the Indian Reorganization Act brought an end to assimilation and began
a policy of encouraging economic development and self-determination.
The 1938 Act was intended to "bring all mineral-leasing matters in
harmony with the IRA","0 2 i.e., to promote tribal economic development.
However, by allowing state taxation the Court limited tribal economic
development and contravened Congress' intent.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712.
Id. at 1725 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1725-26.
Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1709.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at 767 n.5.
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143-44.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at 767 n.5.
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A contrary interpretation of the 1938 Act's intent still mandates
federal preemption of the New Mexico taxes. Statutory ambiguities are
to be resolved in favor of the Indians.' 0 ' This liberal rule of construction necessitates preemption, even if, as the Court found, a contrary
legislative intent was more probable.
Finally, the majority's requirement that only complete abdication
of state activities on the reservation will result in preemption seems
unduly harsh. By requiring total abdication the Court has contravened
Bracker's admonition against applying a "mechanical or absolute" analysis. The Court was unwilling to examine the extreme disproportion
between taxes paid and services received or recognize that the federal
and tribal regulation of leasing is almost exclusive. Both a lack of state
services and a comprehensive regulatory scheme are key elements in
prior preemption cases. Instead, by not examining the federal regulatory scheme and dearth of state services, the Court created a "rigid
rule" for preemption as opposed to the "particularized inquiry" required
in prior cases.1"4
This absolutist approach raises doubts as to the continued vitality
of Bracker's balancing test.0 5 To engage in a balancing test requires
a particularized inquiry into the degree of federal regulation involved,
the regulatory interests of both state and tribe, and the degree of state
services provided. In Cotton, the federal and Indian interests favored
preemption.
As previously noted, a comprehensive regulatory scheme is in place.
Further regulation is provided by the Jicarilla Apaches' own constitution and statutes.' °6 The Tribe also had an obvious additional interest
in maximizing oil and gas revenues, as they generate the vast majority
of Tribal income. Combined, these interests strongly outweighed New
Mexico's meager level of services and regulatory interest. New Mexico's primary interest appears to have been generating additional
revenue through taxation without the necessary provision of services.' 7
Thus under the Court's balancing test the superior federal and tribal
interests mandate preemption of the state taxes.
CONCLUSION

Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico granted New Mexico the right to
impose severance taxes on a non-Indian lessee extracting oil and gas
from reservation land. The Court's analysis was premised on inadequate information concerning the effects of state mineral taxation. Cotton, arguing a commerce clause theory, never introduced evidence of
103. See supra note 60.
104. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1723 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
105. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.
106. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1723 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. A state must justify its tax by more than a general interest in raising revenue.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 336.
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the impact, if any, state taxation had on the Jicarillas. This lack of
evidence means the Court's preemption analysis was predicated on
speculation.
Moreover, the decision neglected prior case law and legislative
intent. Congress and the judiciary have repeatedly recognized a policy
promoting self-sufficiency and tribal sovereignty. Allowing New Mexico's severance tax will reduce Jicarilla revenues and create an impediment to achieving tribal self-sufficiency.
CHARLES BREER
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